Problem: The financial crisis of [2007][2008][2009] has shown that regional problems in the financial industry can quickly spread over to the complete financial system and can even affect the worldwide economy. Thus, current financial systems are characterized by a high degree of interconnections and consequently a high amount of system risk.
Introduction
Contagious diseases are normally treated by isolating the patient. However, in the interlinked financial system, isolation is not (always) possible. The financial crisis of the years [2007] [2008] [2009] has proven that already the default of one large financial institution (Lehman Brothers) can infect and almost destroy the whole system. Therefore, regulators and governments raise concerns about the increasing degree of systemic risk in the financial sector. We contribute to the systemic risk literature by proposing a new governmental bail-out approach that lowers the risk of a system-wide collapse and reduces bail-out costs imposed on the economy.
Systemic risk is defined as risk that affects the industry as a whole 1 . In particular, it refers to the spillover effect that one event (default of a major company, macroeconomic shock, …) causes a cascade of failures throughout the system and, thus, triggers substantial losses. Furthermore, a crisis can even spill over from the financial to the real economy. According to Freixas and Rochet (2008) , ´… systemic crisis may develop either as a result of a macroeconomic shock or as a result of contagion.´ Thus, in a realistic simulation both effects need to be considered in order to develop a model of the financial system and its interdependencies.
Over the last decade, the financial industry has experienced a vast increase in systemic risk. Indicators for system-wide risk extensions are (i) increasing stock return correlations 2 , (ii) rising prices of insurance against losses of large financial institutions (i.e.
CDS spreads) 3 , and (iii) the influence of loss given default (LGD) rates on contagion in the banking system 4 .
But what are the reasons for this recent increase of independencies within the financial system and the corresponding rise in systemic risk? Many research contributions relate the extent of systemic risk to the on-going trend of consolidation and conglomeration of 1 See Freixas and Rochet (2008) . 2 See Nicolo and Kwast (2002) . 3 See Huang et al (2009) . 4 See Memmel et al (2011). financial institutions. 5 Over the last decade, two causes underpin this increase in consolidation and conglomeration in the banking sector: (i) the internationalization of markets due to improvements in information technologies, and (ii) the relaxation of the conglomeration interdiction (Glass-Steagall Act 6 of 1933) by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 7 of 1999 in the US.
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After the great depression banks in the United States were split by the Glass-Steagall
Act of 1933 in investment and commercial banks. Consequently, financial institutions then tend to be smaller, as they were forced by law to stay specialized and as building conglomerations were prohibited. In 1998, the Citigroup merger firstly violated this law. Citigroup took advantage of the Bank Holding Company Act temporary granting consolidations 9 . In 1999, the US Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that finally permitted the merger. As stated by Broome and Markham (2001) , the GrammLeach-Bliley Act can also be referred as the ´Citigroup-Relief-Act´. This act not only allows banks with customer deposits to invest in trading activities, but also reduces the barriers for financial conglomeration. Even though the act allows a higher diversification in business activities, the deregulation fosters a trend 10 towards concentration and conglomeration that increases systemic risk (which can be shown empirically 11 ). The larger banks are, the more harm an insolvency can cause to the financial system, which is the downside of market liberalization. This fact reminds one to the recent metaphor of Georg Soros who compared systemic risk with an oil tanker boat.
12 5 E.g. Nicolo et al (2003) .
To reduce the risk of losing all transported oil (at once), an oil tanker typically consists of many oil compartments. Based on this metaphor, deregulation would be to construct oil tankers without separating walls, directly enhancing the risk of losing the whole oil cargo. With this 6 Refers to the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89,48 Stat. 62 (codified as amended in scattered section of 12 U.S.C.). 7 Also known as the Financial Services Modernization (FSM) Act of the U.S. Public Law No. 106-102, signed into law November 12, 1999. 8 E.g. Nicolo and Kwast (2002) or Nicolo et al. (2003) investigate the impact of conglomeration on financial stability. 9 See Broome and Markham (2001) . 10 Haldane and May (2011) outline the ´recent rise in the size and concentration of the US financial system´. They show that between the years 1933 (right after Glass-Steagall Act) and 1998 (right before the Glamm-Leagall-Bliley Act) the 3 top US banks only held between 10 and 20 % of all commercial banking sector assets. After passing the Glamm-Leagall-Bliley Act, this percentage increased to nearly 40% in 2008. 11 See Neale et al (2010) . 12 Interview of Georg Soros in 2010, published in the documentary ´Inside Job´. metaphor, George Soros aims to explain why financial institution conglomeration and consolidation do not lead to a safer financial network.
By combining four different research areas (Financial Networks, Contagion, Concentration/Conglomeration, and Bail-Outs) we build a model of the financial system and explore the interplay between banking network structure, governmental bail-out strategy, and financial stability. In particular, firstly, we contribute by analyzing the contagion effect on a stand-alone basis using various interconnections between banks. Secondly, we study how the network structure (degree of conglomeration, amount of banks, interlinkage between institutions, borrowing rates, …) determines the stability of the system. To elaborate the main drivers of system stability the system is stressed by both macroeconomic shocks and write-offs due to contagion. The aim is to show and rank the main drivers of system stability.
Finally, the results based on various drivers in the banking network are used to make the system more resilient to macroeconomic shocks and contagion by implementing a new ´soft-bail-out´ concept. This 'soft-bail-out' concept is compared with the current best practice ´Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF)-bail-out´ approach, where only too-big-to-fail banks are bailed-out by the state. The numerical results suggest that our new approach tends to enhance the financial stability of the system and lowers the costs for the state. In this concept, the state uses a bank tax to inject liquidity into the system far before a bank gets insolvent. Additionally, in the new approach the bank tax is structured in a way to optimize system stability.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we provide an overview of the related literature. The network of a financial market with stochastic processes for each node, interlinkages of the nodes, macroeconomic shocks, and bank tax payments is modeled in section 3. In section 4 we describe the current concept of bail-outs of too-big-to-fail banks and the new soft-bail-out concept. Based on our network model, section 5 presents numerical results of the reduction in economic costs and added financial stability. Finally, section 6 concludes and derives suggestions for regulators.
Literature Review
The related literature can be clustered in four different areas: Financial Networks, Contagion, Concentration/Conglomeration, and Bail-Outs.
Research on the Financial Network Approach: Many researchers apply network techniques from theoretical physics and mathematics to explain systemic risk. Eisenberg and Noe (2001) consider banks as nodes of the system and develop an algorithm that measures systemic risk by incorporating small shocks. Empirical work on the network structure of the Austrian interbank market is provided by Boss et al. (2004) . The authors ´… focus on the question of how this structure affects the stability of the network (the banking system) with respect to the elimination of a node in the network (the default of a single bank).´ Their main finding about the Austrian banking market is that ´… there are very few banks with many interbank linkages whereas there are many with only a few links.´ They called this effect ´tiering´. Hanel et al. (2003) examine the potential positive effect of additional ´buffer capital´. They document that additional free capital has no impact on bank behavior. Eboli (2007) uses graph theory and introduces a new ´propagation function´ to model the system of diffusion of losses and insolvencies across the industry. He investigates the relation between characteristics of the network system, e.g. the degree of capitalization, connectivity, and interbank exposures. As a result, he designs a network structure that reduces default contagion. Nier et al. (2008) build a banking network simulation tool to investigate default dynamics and random shock transmission with respect to different capitalizations, interbank exposures, connectivity and concentrations (incl. ´tiered networks´). However, as stated by Allen and Babus (2008) , ´the literature of financial networks is still at an early stage´. So far, most academic contributions study financial stability, such as network effects caused by the failure of one bank, i.e. the drop of a node within the network, but seldom focus on the development of new mechanism to increase the stability as a whole.
Research on the Contagion Approach: Besides macroeconomic shocks, contagion is, according to Freixas and Rochet (2008) , the second reason for a systemic crisis. Thus, besides macroeconomic shocks we also consider contagion in our model. Many authors focus on informational contagion and analyze the behaviour of banks and depositors.
The famous contribution of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) focuses on insurances to avoid bank runs in case of liquidity shocks that arise due to self-fulfilling depositors´ expectations. For the first time, their model addresses the system of contagion. Allen and Gale contribute two important models Gale (1998, 2000) ). In their 1998 paper, they expand the Diamond-Dybvig model by implementing random returns and earlier access to return information. In their 2000 paper, they explore the response of the financial system to contagion if banks are related in different structures. Against intuition, they show that the more connections within a financial system exist, the more resilient it is since losses are transferred to other banks and, thus, shared within the whole industry.
To prevent systemic crisis, they advise regulators to inject liquidity globally (by forcing repos or open market operations). Freixas et al. (2000) construct a model that captures individual bank risks of random funds withdrawings by customers. Their main question is whether a liquidity shock of one bank can spill over to other banks. In contrast to Allen and Gale (2000) , they advise regulators to provide liquidity to specific financial intermediaries instead of flooding the market with liquidity. However, both papers agree on the fact that more connections increase the resilience of the whole banking system. On the other hand, Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007) address a decentralized banking system from the perspective of a social planner that only wants to optimize the structure. A decentralized system is the best solution if the probability of default of the banks throughout the system is low.
Problems arise when undercapitalized banks start to gamble.
The main findings in this area of research are summarized by Freixas and Rochet (2008) : ´(i) The level of buffers each bank has ... is a key determinant of contagion. (ii) The way in which the failure of a bank is resolved has an impact on the propagation of the crisis. (iii) The system of cross-holdings of assets and liabilities … is essential in triggering systemic crisis. (iv) The specific architecture of this system of cross-holdings matters. A system where each bank borrows only from one bank is more fragile than a system where the sources of funds are more diversified.´
Research on Conglomeration and Concentration:
This research area tries to answer the question whether deregulation of markets and allowance of concentration yields to systemic risk and, thus, to a more fragile banking system. Neale et al (2010) examine the impact of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on different sectors of the financial service in-dustry in the US. However, their results about the conglomeration and concentration for the US market are applicable to all financial systems. They find that ´… the reduction of regulation may increase systemic risk …´, but is mitigated at the same time as deregulation allows a higher degree of diversification. Additionally, this recent contribution gives a useful overview of the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the empirical evidence of the impact over the last decade. Likewise, Nicolo et al. (2003) empirically focus on the relationship of conglomerates and systemic risk and also find that more concentrated markets (concentration) with larger institutions (conglomeration) yields a more fragile banking system. The fact that the famous journal Nature has recently published an systemic-risk article by Haldane and May (2011) , underlines the current significance of this topic to the world-wide economy system. They use zoological models to explore the interplay of system complexity and stability and point out that both diversity and modularity ´protects the system resilience of both natural and constructed networks´ such as the financial banking network.
Research on Bank Bail-Outs: According to the early ideas of Bagehot (1873) 13 13 See Freixas and Rochet (2008) .
, the founding father of regulatory financial research and the TBTF-approach, central banks function as the lender of last resort (LLR) in case of a potential liquidity shortage of a systemically-relevant, i.e. a too-big-to-fail (TBTF), and solvent bank. Even though many authors and governments consider Bagehot´s idea as obsolete and out-dated, Rochet and Vives (2004) review the idea and confirm, more than hundred years later, his view: a solvent bank (i.e. a bank with a viable business model) can indeed become illiquid. This provides the foundation for the necessity of public bail-outs of solvent but illiquid to TBTF banks. Beside many research papers on the moral hazard of bail-outs, Aghion et al. (1999) argue that too restrictive ´… bank (dis-) closure rules have counterproductive effects on bank managers´ incentives to invest and disclosure prudently´.
In order to motivate managers to report truthfully, they put forward the idea of soft-bailouts, where managers are immune from dismissals. Nevertheless, some researchers, such as Stern and Feldman (2004) criticize that the practice of bail-outs of all too-bigto-fail banks generates moral hazard for TBTF-bank towards a higher risk taking.
Modeling the Financial Market
In order to study the stability of the financial system, we, firstly, need to model the financial institutions as nodes of the network. Since financial institutions do not share all available assets of the banking market equally, we, secondly, take the different sizes of banks in the network into account. To study network resiliencies, we, thirdly, integrate a realistic interlinkage system between the financial institutions. Fourth, as financial markets experience shocks, expressed in loss of equity, we implement idiosyncratic 14 and system-wide shocks. 15 Fifth, we integrate bank taxation payments in modelling our financial market.
Modeling One Financial Institution
In accordance with network theory (see, e.g. Eboli (2007) 14 An idiosyncratic shock hits one participant of the system. According to the interlinkage of participants in the system, one shock imposes a spillover-effect to other participants. Compare the inclusion of idiosyncratic shocks with Nier et al. (2008) . 15 Note that shocks and contagion caused by the default of one large institution is included in modelling nodes, i.e. financial institutions, with stochastic processes. 16 However, in contrast to the Merton Model, we also consider defaults during and not only at the end of the observation period. Furthermore, we define a default based on a minimum capital requirement framework. 
The higher the capital ratio, the lower the leverage and, in accordance with the Diamond-Dybvig model, the more stable the financial institution should be. A better capitalization implies that more equity can absorb losses, e.g. due to earnings-fluctuations, spillover write-offs, and macroeconomic shocks, earlier.
As all financial institutions have to respect the same minimum capital requirements, the initial capital ratio (CR 0,i ) will be similar for all banks in the analyzed financial system (network). Therefore, we use in our simulation for all financial institutions in the system an equal initial capital ratio, i.e.
. However, within the simulation, the capital ratio ( i t CR , ) fluctuates differently according to the realization of the equity and firm value processes of institution i, i.e.
Within the whole observation period, a financial institution i defaults or is, at least, in danger of default if the capital ratio (CR t,i ) is smaller than a specified minimum capital
17 See Diamond and Dybvig (1983) .
, for instance 4.5% (as proposed in the new Basel III Accord; without conversion or countercyclical buffer), thus if CR t,i = E t,i /V t,i < CR Min . In this case the bank will be closed or bailed-out by the regulator. If, on the other hand, institution i meets the minimum capital requirements, thus
Defaults of nodes at time t are expressed in the default vector F t , which we need for technical reasons. In case node i defaults in period t the respective entry f t,i in the default vector F t is 1, and it is 0 in case of no default or in case the default occurred in one of the previous time steps. In other words,
Structure of the Financial System
The structure of the financial system consists in our case of two components. First, the amount N of financial institutions (with N N ≤ ), and second, the distribution of all assets in the system, i.e. the initial distribution of the firm value V t,i . The amount of financial institutions in a financial system differs across countries and can be influenced by policy makers. Thus, parameter N is kept variable.
The sizes of financial institutions are not always homogeneous in a system. In general, the opposite holds true. The distribution of all available assets in a financial system ( 
Interlinkage of Financial Institutions
Each financial institution has a fixed proportion I i of assets that is interlinked with other institutions, and a fraction of 1 -I i of assets that is not interlinked. Each node N i ∈ can have a link to another node j with j i ≠ . The probability that node i has lent assets to node j is denoted as p ij , which is named Erdös-Rényi probability. For simplicity reasons and to lower the number of randomly chosen variables in the simulation, we set the en-
and
In accordance with Boss et al (2004) , we name the N x N -dimensional matrix of assets lent from institution j to borrowing institution i the liability matrix L i,j . In contrast to Boss et al. (2004) , we do not focus on the structure of the lent assets. Thus, we normalize the amount borrowed by i from j by the relative size of the initial firm value of the lending institution V 0,j . In other words, financial institutions borrow more from bigger counterparts than from smaller ones. In our model, the entries of the liability matrix L are calculated by using the initial firm value V 0,i of N different institutions and the Erdös-Rényi probability matrix entries:
As (by definition from above) the diagonal of the Erdös-Rényi probability matrix is zero, L´s diagonal is zero too, i.e. In order to calculate the write-off matrix W t,i over time, we need to multiply the liability matrix with the default vector F t in each period t.
These write-offs have to be implemented in the firm value process. Thus, in case of considered write-offs, equation (1) has to be rewritten to
Idiosyncratic and System-wide Macroeconomic Shocks
Since the financial crisis was not only the result of contagion after the default of one bank, but is also related to economic turmoil 23 N i ∈ , we additionally implement macroeconomic shocks in our model. A fixed amount k of shocks over the whole observation period T that hits all banks with a shock severity of ( )
is integrated in the model and indicating losses relative to the initial firm value. The occurrence of k different shocks is randomly distributed over the observation period. Each shock lowers directly the firm value process of bank i in time-step t by S t,i . Therefore, the shock term S t,i has to be implemented into equation (2):
Shocks are calculated as follows
Bank Taxation Payments
As a consequence of the financial crisis, regulators are trying to implement new regimes and rules, e.g. Basel III, that set new limitations and requires more capital insurance.
However, in contrast to asking for more equity, Freixas and Rochet (2010) 23 E.g. Gale (1998, 2000) argue that financial crisis tend to arise as consequence of an economic downturn. 24 Besides an additional tax on bonuses, in most countries the bank tax (or the currently discussed proposals for bank taxes) follows the same principle: It is calculated as a certain percentage number of total assets minus equity. In Germany, banks have to pay annually, depending on their size, between 0.02% and 0.04% of total assets minus equity and minus saving deposits. In Austria, banks have to pay 0.07%
is the proportion of assets minus equity that has to be paid.
In accordance with Aussenegg and Kronfellner (2011) 
Although this bank tax construction reminds one to an option payoff, there are no options involved. The alternative bank tax is parameterized such that banks have to pay on average the same amount compared to the traditional bank tax 28 of their total assets as bank tax. Sweden proposed a national bank tax of 0.018% of total assets minus equity. In the United States, the bank tax proposed by the US president (see The White House Page of Fees -Office of Press Secretary: press release, January 14, 2011) is a Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee that ´… would require the largest and most highly levered Wall Street firms to pay back taxpayers for the extraordinary assistance …´. It would amount to 0.15% of total assets minus Tier I capital and minus insured deposits.
. This fact simplifies a 25 This proportion b has to be set by the local regulators and is a tool to regulate the system. 26 See Aussenegg and Kronfellner (2011) . 27 Note that we only take into account interconnections to other banks if they are not secured or hedged. In practice, this would mean that we only need to consider current credit lines to other financial institutions. 28 The factor 2 in the alternative bank tax equation scales it to the traditional bank tax. In mathematical terms: The expected alternative bank tax payments equals the traditional bank tax payments, i. 
where B t,i can either be the traditional or the alternative bank tax, i.e.
The question remains how the new funds from the bank tax should be used most efficiently to finance future bank bail-outs, as suggested by Freixas and Rochet (2010) . The approach in the next section tries to answer this question.
Measuring and Modeling Bank Bail Outs
The model of the financial market, developed in the previous chapter, is not complete.
Bail-outs by the central bank of too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, need to be implemented such that we can compare the current approach to bail-outs with the new concept of a soft-bail-out. However, measuring the efficiency of a concept is not easy. Many ratios and measurements can be applied to capture how much a mechanism is able to ease the systemic risk in the financial industry. Therefore, we, firstly, focus in this chapter on measuring the stability of a financial system, and, secondly, describe the current and the new bail-out approaches.
Measuring Bank Stability
We decide to use two common measures to show how much a new concept can increase the stability of the financial system: (i) the simulated weighted default rate of the whole system (weighted based on the banks total assets), and (ii) the economic costs for bailouts.
We design the weighted default rate as the proportion of defaulted assets (not numbers of banks) in the system in comparison to the total amount of assets in the system. Since defaults of small banks are not as server as the insolvency of large banks, we weight the default rate with the initial size of the bank V o,i . Obviously, the higher the weighted default rate (
) at the end of the observation period (t = T), the higher the probability of the total collapse of the financial system. T Ω is calculated as matrix multiplica- The costs for bail-outs are divided into bail-out costs for the government (C G ) and bailout costs for banks (C B ). Consequently, the sum of both equals the total costs for the whole economy and is denoted economical bail-out costs (C).
The bail-out costs for the government (C G ) are only driven by the need of a bank bailout. In both approaches, a bank will be bailed-out by the state if it belongs to the group of the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks. A bank is a TBTF-bank if its initial firm value V 0,i settles above the TBTF-Borderline (V TBTF ), indicated as a percentage number of assets owned compared to all assets (V 0 ) in the financial system. We indentify bank i as a
The bail-out costs for banks (C B ) only consist of the bank tax. However, these expenses can be seen as a liquidity reserve collected by the government to finance further necessary 29 future bail-outs.
Two Bail-Out Concepts
In this section, we describe the two bail-out concepts: ´TBTF-bail-out´ and ´soft-bailout´ and we will compare them in the next chapter according to the two measures of stability.
(a) The first concept, the ´TBTF-bail-out´, is the current best practice of governments to bail-out too-big-to-fail banks. If within the observation period the realization of the residual equity process E t,i of a TBTF-bank is lower than the realization of the firm value process V t,i times the minimum capital ratio CR Min , for instance 4.5%, the government bails-out the bank by recapitalizing it via a capital injection to the higher capital ratio CR I . Consequently, this approach requires the (partial) nationalization of the insolvent bank and, as the firm value almost equals the debt process, we assume that the government pays nothing to shareholders in acquiring the troubled institution. In this TBTFbail-out concept the traditional bank tax is applied, i.e. Implementing the bail-out of too-big-to-fail banks into the equity process implies:
The additional term i t dE , is the bail-out payment by the state. This payment should recapitalize troubled banks up to capital ratio of CR I , a specific too-big-to-fail capital injection ratio parameter, for instance 9%. It is only paid to ´insolvent´ (
29 According to our definition, we consider a bail-out as `necessary` if the bank is big enough, i.e. belongs to the group of TBTF-banks, such that the government -per model construction -needs to bail-out the bank.
(b) The second concept is a new approach called ´soft-bail-out´. The government would use the liquidity reserve from the bank tax to boost the firm value V t,i of all troubled banks (and not only the TBTF-banks) far before the insolvency. This liquidity injection -that is already conducted in the area of the bank´s solvency -allows the bank to recover from a downturn on its own 30 . The point of liquidity injection is given by softbail-out-capital ratio borderline (CR SBO ), of, for instance, 6%. Note that CR SBO is similar for all banks.
However, if the bank could not manage to fight its financial troubles with this early liquidity injection and is still heading towards bankruptcy, the government will -as in the normal bail-out approach -bail-out the crisis-ridden TBTF-bank. Thus, the soft-bail-out concept can be seen as an enriched normal TBTF-bail-out concept, as in case of insolvency a TBTF bank receives a (´normal´) bail-out too.
As the liquidity injection directly increases the equity of the bank, it needs to be added to the equity process function and equation (5) 30 Moreover and as already implemented in the EU restructuring process, we suggest that a liquidity injection via a soft-bail-out requires the submission of a bank-restructuring concept from the bank. This condition should help troubled banks to turnaround the obviously miss-functioning business model.
In times of profit, firms usually boost their business by increasing the leverage, i.e. institutions take more debt. In our model, this means that above a specific maximum capital ratio (CR Max ), for instance 12%, banks increase leverage such that the capital ratio equals exactly this maximum capital ratio. Figure 2 gives an overview of the four different capital ratio boundaries (CR Min , CR SBO , CR I , and CR Max ) for too-big-to-fail and for non-too-big-to-fail institutions. Note that meaningful assumptions of these four different capital ratio boundaries must satisfy the following inequation CR Min < CR SBO < CR I < CR Max .
### Insert Figure 2 about here ###
On the left hand side of the graph, we illustrate the situation for non-too-big-to-fail institutions, which will not be bailed-out by the government in case of insolvency. Below the minimum capital ratio (CR Min ) the institution is in our model per definition defaulted. If the new soft-bail-out concept is used, institutions below the soft-bail-out capital ratio (CR SBO ) receive soft-bail-out payments from the state, which pushes the capital ratio (CR t,i ) away from the default area. (The amount of capital that is used for the softbail-out of institution i depends on the funds that i has paid to the state in previous periods.) Above the maximum capital ratio (CR Max ), institutions are considered to increase leverage by taking more debt, which pushes the capital ratio again at the maximum capital ratio.
On the right hand side Figure 2 , we consider the situation for too-big-to-fail institutions.
They will be bailed-out by the government if the capital ratio (CR t,i ) falls below the minimum capital ratio (CR Min ). As described above, TBTF bail-out means that the bank is (partial) nationalized and the capital ratio CR t,i is increased by the government till the TBTF capital injection ratio CR I .
Numerical Simulation and Results
Even though the above descript model might remind the reader of the relatively new theory of general stochastic hybrid systems, an analytical solution cannot be achieved due to the complexity of the model. As every time step t of the observation period T can be a hitting time (i.e. where a bank turns insolvent) for the N different realizations of firm value processes, a solution would consists of T different convolutions for all N different institutions, which cannot be calculated properly. Consequently, we use -in analogy to most financial networks-and contagion-research contributions -a numerical Monte Carlo Simulation approach to derive results.
Simulation Method and Assumptions
We use Monte Carlo Simulation (and the software package Crystal Ball) to demonstrate 
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Steps and Iterations
The overall observation period is divided into 100 different steps. In our simulation we interpret one step as one quarter of a year and parameterize the model upon. Thus, the whole observation period consists of 25 years, which is a long time horizon but a realistic view for systemic risk considerations. However, any other number of steps could be applied and would deliver comparable results. At each step we calculate for all N different banks their profits, firm values, potential defaults, write-offs, bank-taxes, etc. The
Monte Carlo Simulation is performed with 10,000 iterations. This means that each of the 100 steps are calculated 10,000 times with 30 = ≤ N N different stochastic processes for the firm value process, as described in the section above. 31 The software Crystal Ball is used to conduct Monte Carlo Simulations.
Modeling the Banks´ Profit
The increments t V ∆ of the firm value process V t and, thus, also the equity process E t are determined by the profit. As the model is designed to capture situations in the financial sector, yearly mean and standard deviation of the profit are simulated based on daily returns of the S&P Banking Index (BIX) over the six year period from 2006 until 2011 32 . This time period ensures that we encounter the situation of a steep decrease in value in an environment of high volatility. Hence, our simulation can be taken as a realistic extreme or stress test scenario.
Measuring the Contagion Effect
It is commonly known in the academic literature that contagion is the critical factor for financial network failures. 33 Our model is built in a way such that the contagion effect can be carved-out from others factors and can be directly measured. To show this effect,
we set up the model such that the government never bails-out a bank 34 and simulate the weighted default rates for different interlinkage proportions (I i ). Recall that the interlinkage proportion indicates the percentage of assets connected to other financial institutions within the system and has, therefore, to be written-off in case of a counterpart default. 45%), then bail-outs are no more an option for the regulator, as the whole financial system will collapse very likely.
### Insert Figure 3 about here ###
This analysis exhibits that the degree of bank interconnections within a system is a crucial driver for contagion.
Drivers of Instability
In accordance to many research contributions, such as Nier et al (2008), we fixed in the previous chapter all input parameters (except the interlinkage proportion) with a ceteris paribus approach to perform the Monte Carlo Simulation. This allows us to carve out the contagion effect in order to study it stand-alone. However, in the real world, many factors need to be taken into account together. Thus, we try to answer the question of many regulators and governments on which factors of the financial system they need to
focus on and what parameter manipulation is most efficient to stabilize the financial system as a whole. The system parameters we focus on are:
• Interlinkage proportion (I i )
• Amount of shocks (k)
• Initial capital ratio (CR 0 )
• Amount of banks (N)
• Severity of shocks (h)
• Costs of debt (r D )
• Financial structure
By using Monte Carlo Simulation, we perform a sensitivity analysis of all model parameters and study how they influence the weighted default rate, which is the objective 35 Fitted to the S&P Banking Index BIX.
function in this analysis. 
### Insert Figure 4 about here ###
Based on these results, regulators and governments can design new regulations and limiting requirements for these parameters to further stabilize the financial system. Normally, some of those parameters are already given by the financial network. For instance, in Austria the tiering-structure is given and cannot be changed (easily) by the regulator.
Consequently, for a set of given parameters, regulators can perform optimizations to find the value for the not-given parameters that most efficiently stabilize the system. 36 The sensitivity analysis is performed by the software package Crystal Ball. While it runs the Monte Carlo simulation, Crystal Ball uses the method of Rank Correlation to dynamically calculate the relationships among the parameters and the results of the simulation.
Comparing TBTF-Bail-Out with Soft Bail-Out Concept
In this section we compare the traditional TBTF-bail-out concept and the new soft-bailout concept. To recall, in the traditional TBTF-bail-out concept an insolvent bank will be bailed out by the state if it is a too-big-to-fail bank, i.e. (V 0,i / V 0 ) > V TBTF . We set a maximum of 50% of banks that are bailed-out.
b
In this traditional approach the bank tax is calculated as a percentage of the difference between asset and equity and needs to be paid in every period. In our simulation b = 0.01% per step, i.e. a quarter of a year, which is comparable to the German and Austrian legislation.
In contrast, in the new soft-bail-out concept the bank tax is an earnings tax that only needs to be paid if the return per period is positive. Moreover, the bank tax is linked to the amount of interconnections of the bank within the financial system. Thus, the bank tax increases with the amount of interconnections. In addition to the traditional TBTFbail out, in the new soft-bail-out concept banks already receive funds far before their bankruptcy. This allows banks to recover from financially troubled times on their own.
The soft-bail-out payment is injected to troubled banks at an optimal point -according to our Monte Carlo Simulation optimization results 38 -of CR SBO = 6%.
To provide an overview, Table 1 compares the three approaches along the main characteristics: bail-out trigger event, bank tax calculation, and bank tax calculation linked to the interlinkage proportion of the bank.
The three approaches analyzed are:
• TBTF-bail-out (with traditional bank tax)
• Soft-bail-out without connection between bank tax and the interlinkage proportion (with alternative bank tax)
• Soft-bail-out with connection between bank tax and the interlinkage proportion (with alternative bank tax) We show that the new soft-bail-out concept improves the traditional TBTF-bail-out approach in three dimensions: (i) the new approach is less costly, (ii) the bail-out costs are less volatile when credit lines (i.e. interlinkage proportions) change 39 , and (iii) it is more stable (i.e. lowers the weighted default rate).
Ad (i):
In a first step we compare the two approaches TBTF-bail-out and soft-bail-out w/o. As the interlinkage proportion (I 0 ) is the main driver of contagion and system stability, we plot the economic bail-out costs (C) on a I 0 -C-coordinate system. Figure 5 reveals how the soft-bail-out approach (without considering the connection between bank tax and interlinkage proportion) lowers, compared to the traditional TBTF-bail-out concept, economic costs (C) (which are the bail-out costs for the government (C G ) minus the bail-out costs for all banks (C B )). The area above the x-axis represents negative economic costs (C) and can be seen as profit for the economy (the government) that can be used elsewhere. In contrast, the area below the x-axis displays positive costs (C), implying that the bank tax does not provide enough funds to cover all bail-out costs. In this case, the economy (the government) needs to finance the bank-bail-outs with other funds. The two lines in Figure 5 are the result of linear regressions on 10,000 data points of Monte Carlo Simulations for the two bail-out approaches. The parallel shift of the two lines, indicated by the arrows in Figure 5 , can be interpreted as reduction in government costs (C G ), whereas the costs borne by banks (C B ) are the same in both ap-40 Even though the R 2 of the linear regression is lower than for a regression with a higher order, we choose linear regression lines to easier compare the two concepts. proaches. 41 In other words, under the same circumstances (bank tax and weighted default rate 42 ) the new soft-bail-out concept is less costly than the traditional TBTF-bailout approach. Economically spoken, the increase in system efficiency is caused by the fact that in the soft-bail-out approach banks receive a liquidity injection far before their insolvency and, thus, have the opportunity to (easier) recover on their own.
### Insert Figure 5 about here ###
Ad (ii):
In a second step we consider the connection between the alternative bank tax and the interlinkage proportion, as described in equation (4). 
Ad (iii):
In both, the first and the second step of our simulation, we can show that the weighted default rate decreases in a soft-bail-out concept, implying a more stable financial system. This effect is indicated in Figures 4 and 5 by circled numbers. They reveals that the TBTF-bail-out approach generates a weighted default rate of 20%, whereas the 41 Note that the alternative bank tax is parameterized according to the traditional bank tax in order to simplify a potential implementation of this new mechanism in the bank sector. 42 The weighted default rate is even slightly smaller by applying the soft-bail-out concept than it is for the traditional TBTF-bail-out approach. 43 Eisenberg and Noe (2001) even describe linkages between firms as cyclical and create the term cyclical interdependence.
soft-bail-out approaches generates lower rates of 17% and even 16%, in case the bank tax is connected to the interlinkage proportion.
Robustness checks
Having outlined the three dimensions of improvements of the new approach, we finally focus on the question of model sensitivity. In other words, what happens to the results and to the relative positions of the regression lines if we consider other scenarios?
Therefore, as shown in Table 2 , we define a best-, base-, and worst-case scenario by varying the main model parameters (amount of banks (N), amount of shocks (k), initial capital ratio (CR 0 ), severity of shocks (h), and debt costs (r D )). As the interlinkage parameter (I) is the most influential driver for financial stability, we vary it in every calculation and illustrate it on the x-axis of the charts in Figures 7 and 8 . The two least influential parameters, the financial network structure and the debt costs (r D ) remain fixed.
The column ´Sensitivity´ in Table 2 refers to the results of Figure 4 , where we outline the degree of influence of the parameters. 
In contrast, the soft-bail-out concept with connection to the bank tax should be preferred when banks are highly interlinked with each other. Note that in the best case (see Panel (a) of Figure 7 ), where no shock appears, banks have a high initial capital ratio of 15%, the costs for debt are zero, and the amount of banks is low, the economy even receives money from the bank tax (for interlinkage values of 40% and lower).
### Insert Figure 7 about here ### Furthermore, we analyze the effect of changing only one parameter from the base case in Table 2 to the best-or worst-case. Moreover, in all cases (see Figure 7 ) and (parameter-wise) variation of the base case (see Figure 8) , the weighted default rates ( Ω ) of the soft-bail-out concepts are better than for the TBTF-concept, the current best practice.
Concluding Remarks and Implications
In the run-up to the recent financial crisis, regulators and financial institutions intend to avoid future crisis and, thus, strive to strengthen the financial system for upcoming shocks and bankruptcies. Especially, systemic risk has become an industry-wide concern. So far, new regulatory regimes, new taxations, new limitations of bank´s capital ratios, etc., have been installed to stabilize the system. However, the contagion effect as the main driver of systemic risk has been hardly tackled directly yet. In order to do so, this paper contributes in applying ideas from four different research areas -Financial Networks, Contagion, Concentration/Conglomeration, and Bail-Outs -and proposes a new soft-bail-out concept that can reduce contagion after macroeconomic shocks or bankruptcies.
By including the most important network parameters of the current financial system in our model, we, firstly, show that the interconnectivity between banks is the main driver of contagion. Secondly, we outline the influence of all parameters on the system stability and rank them. Thirdly, we elaborate a new soft-bail-out concept for regulators that lowers the costs for (necessary) bank bail-outs, decreases the fluctuation of bail-out costs, and increases the stability in terms of the system-wide default rate. This soft-bailout approach refers to the idea that governmental funds are injected far before bank insolvency. To finance these funds an alternative bank tax, connected to the most influential driver of instability, the interconnectivity of banks, is proposed. Thus, the concept suggests that a bank needs to pay more if it is highly connected to other financial market participants. Furthermore, for banks this new bank tax is equally expensive compared to a bank tax that is calculated as a proportion of total assets or total assets minus equity, as it is currently often applied in practice.
Based on our results, we drive three implications for regulators and governments:
(i) Current bank taxes should be changed from a fixed proportion of total assets system to an earnings based system. This would put less pressure on already troubled banks.
(ii) Bank taxes should be related to the interconnectivity of the corresponding bank, as this parameter tends to be the main driver of financial instability.
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(iii) Soft-bail-out payments -paid far before an actual insolvency occurs -should be implemented, funded by the proposed alternative bank tax. This would allow troubled banks to recover on their own.
As an outlook to further research based on this paper, we want to mention the following additional ideas: first, a cyclical modeling of the market drift and volatility and, consequently, of capital ratios would even more precisely describe financial markets. Second, the collected funds from an alternative bank tax for future soft-bail-outs could be kept in the banks as liability reserves instead of being transferred to the governmental budget.
Third, the asset process could be divided into different asset categories. Upon this separation a more precise asset modeling with stochastic processes and calculation of risk weighted assets would be possible. The relationship of interlinkage proportion and weighted default rate of the total system is simulated by using N = 30 banks, no macroeconomic shocks, a leverage ratio of l i = 10 i ∀ , i.e. 10% equity), costs of debt of r D = 5% p.a. , total asset values standardized to V 0 = 1,000 currency units, a linear heterogeneous financial structure (the firm value increases from institution to institution by the same amount), and a too-big-to-fail-(TBTF-) bail-out concept. The firm value process is the sum of the equity-and debtprocess, where the debt process is an initially fixed movement of the exponential process (see equation (1)) and the equity value is modeled with a stochastic process (with mean and standard deviation parameters based on the BIX (S&P Banking Index) by applying a rolling window of one year). However, all other (realistic) parameter values would generate comparable results (see sensitivity analysis results in Figures 7 and 8 ). 
Appendix: Notation overview
